

The Institutional Arrangement Between an NGO Focal Organization and a UN Body

The Case of Climate Action Network International and the UNFCCC

Christian Holz
University of Ottawa
School of Political Studies

Report prepared for Major Groups Partnership on Forests,
“Sustainable Forest Management: Designing the Vehicles
For Securing the Means of Implementation” Conference,
Kathmandu, Nepal, 2-6 March 2015.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents	2
List of Figures, Tables, Boxes and Annexes	2
Executive Summary	3
Introduction	3
Aim and Scope of the Study	4
Background of the Study	4
Method of Data Collection	6
Internal Structure and Processes of Climate Action Network.....	6
CAN Governance, Nodes, Working Groups, and Sources of Funding.....	6
CAN's Process For Formulating Shared Positions	10
Climate Action Network and the UNFCCC.....	14
Managing Scarce Resources, Transmitting Information	14
Managing Stakeholder Engagement	16
Conclusions.....	20
Policy Recommendations	21
Notes.....	22
List of Acronyms and Glossary.....	25
References Cited.....	28

List of Figures, Tables, Boxes and Annexes

Figure: Participation at COPs – Breakdown of Parties, Observers, and Media.....	5
Table: UNFCCC Constituencies Over Time and UN Major Groups.....	5
Box: The Three Settings of CAN's involvement with the UNFCCC.....	8

Holz, Christian: *The Institutional Arrangement Between an NGO Focal Organization and a UN Body: The Case of Climate Action Network International and the UNFCCC*. Ottawa: Major Groups Partnership on Forests. 2015.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this study reflect the personal opinion of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Major Groups Partnership on Forests.

Executive Summary

This study focuses on Climate Action Network's (CAN) engagement in the negotiating process under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Climate Action Network's internal structures and processes have developed over time to engage in this process as effectively as possible. In particular, over time, new CAN regional and national nodes have been added to the two original ones (Europe and US) to reflect the growing membership of now 900 organizations spanning 100 countries. Likewise, reflecting the shifting and expanding nature of the UNFCCC, the number and scope of issue-based working groups has shifted over time, with currently 14 issue-based working groups, plus one communications group and one overarching "political coordination group" in existence. These working groups are central as most of the policy formation work within CAN takes place there. The study elaborates in detail on the policy formation process, which is characterized by clear timelines and a process that allows CAN to reach consensus positions on the topics relevant to the UNFCCC deliberations. The study also discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the relative timing of policy formation processes, concluding that what is termed the "virtual setting" is the preferable setting for policy formation as it avoids the negative impacts on advocacy effectiveness that policy formation in the in-session setting would entail. The most ideal solution, policy development workshops held independently from UNFCCC sessions, is utilized very rarely as limits to resources prohibit this model.

Turning to the relationship between CAN – as one of the constituency focal point organizations – and the UNFCCC secretariat, one role of focal point organizations is disseminating information to their affiliated organizations as well as managing scarce resources such as secondary access badges, intervention opportunities, office space, meeting room bookings, etc. Crucially, there are areas with tensions between non-governmental observers and the UNFCCC secretariat. Many of these tensions can primarily be traced back to diminishing access to the UNFCCC deliberations for observers over time and the relative lack of clarity, transparency and predictability of rules for observer engagement. It is clear, however, that the UNFCCC system is responsive to instances of challenging these rules, as experienced for example when witnessing changes to the document access policy, the cost recovery policy for side events, access to meeting rooms, and the continuation of CAN's daily newsletter, Eco, in paper format. Some of these challenges utilized the clout of Parties that shared observers' concerns for open and effective participation of observers in the UNFCCC process.

Introduction

This report was commissioned by the Major Groups Partnership on Forests (MGPoF) in order to learn from experiences of stakeholder engagement in other environmental treaty processes under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). In particular, this report focuses on the Environmental NGO (ENGO) constituency, and even more specifically, Climate Action Network International (CAN, or CAN-I) in the context of the negotiations of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, or "the Convention").

Aim and Scope of the Study

The principle aim of the study is to present a detailed insight into the internal decision making processes of CAN as well as the interactions between CAN and the UNFCCC, specifically the UNFCCC secretariat and the Parties to the UNFCCC. As such, and due to the limited space available here, the study largely excludes consideration of other stakeholder constituencies that are engaging the UNFCCC process (including the “second half” of the ENGO constituency, Climate Justice Now!, or CJN!) as well as the activities of CAN that are not directly related to the UNFCCC.

After providing a short background on stakeholder involvement in the UNFCCC process and elaborating the data collection methods for this study, the main part of the study will first focus in the inner workings of CAN, a focal point organizations for the ENGO constituency, by elaborating on CAN’s structural make-up of nodes and working groups as well as the deliberative processes of policy formulation within these structures.

Secondly, the relationships between the UNFCCC and CAN will be explored, including interactions with the UNFCCC secretariat, the formal and informal ways in which CAN contributes to the multilateral negotiation process under the UNFCCC and a discussion of the policies and practices that govern stakeholder engagement within the UNFCCC. Following this main section, the study will close with conclusions and, based on lessons learned from the case study, provide policy recommendations for focal organizations in UN processes.


Background of the Study

The UNFCCC was signed in 1992 and since its inception (and, in fact, even during the negotiations of the Convention itself), there has been substantial stakeholder participation which is also explicitly encouraged in the Convention (UNFCCC 1992: 12) and stakeholder participants have long outnumbered the delegates of Parties to the Convention (see Figure). However this trend has somewhat reversed since the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP) in Copenhagen, 2009 (UNFCCC 2014a), since many ENGOs disengaged with the UNFCCC process after the widely perceived failure of that conference (Bodansky 2010; Dimitrov 2010; Sethi 2010; McGregor 2011; Greenpeace International 2009) and, as will be argued below, because access restrictions on the part of the UNFCCC have become increasingly more pervasive. Overall, however, participation of observers has been very strong in the UNFCCC process, with observer delegates at COPs peaking at over 13,000 in 2009 and remaining around the 4,000-5,000 level since then.

Non-governmental observer organization under the UNFCCC are categorized in formally recognized constituencies, to which observer organizations self-associate and which largely follow the “Major Groups” categories in use elsewhere in the UN system (see Table), with some important exceptions, which stem from the historical evolution of the constituency system within the UNFCCC over time:

Initially, only Environmental NGOs (ENGOs) and the “Business and Industry NGOs” (BINGOs) were recognized observer constituencies. “Local Government and Municipal Authorities” (LGMAs) were recognized as a constituency in 1995, “Indigenous Peoples’ Organisations” (IPOs) followed in 2001, “Research and Independent NGOs” (RINGOs) in 2003, TUNGOs – the Trade Union NGOs – in 2008, and Youth NGOs (YOUNGOs) as well

Figure: Participation at COPs – Breakdown of Parties, Observers, and Media



Sources: UNFCCC (2011, 2014)

as “Women and Gender” followed in 2011. At the time of writing, “Farmers” operate as a de-facto informal constituency but have not formally been recognized. It is important to note that there are a substantial number of organizations that have not associated themselves with a constituency, for example, the increasing number of faith-based organizations involved in the UNFCCC process¹.

Table: UNFCCC Constituencies Over Time and UN Major Groups

UNFCCC Constituency	Established	Corresponding Major Group
ENGOS	1990	NGOs
BINGOs	1990	Business and Industry
LGMA	1995	Local Authorities
IPOs	2001	Indigenous Peoples
RINGOs	2003	Scientific and technological community
TUNGOs	2008	Forest Workers and Trade Unions
Women and Gender	2011	Women
YUNGOs	2011	Youth and Children
Farmers	ongoing	Farmers and Small Landowners
Faith-based Organizations	---	---
Unaffiliated	n/a	n/a

Sources: Holz (2012), UNFCCC (2014b)

Of particular importance for the study at hand is the unique status of the ENGO constituency in that it has not one, but two focal point organization. This situation dates from 2008, when Friends of the Earth International’s withdrawal of their membership in CAN provided the final momentum for a pre-existing, but less formal coalition of climate justice focused organizations to formalize their cooperation under the name Climate

Justice Now! (CJN!). As a result, the UNFCCC secretariat now treats both CAN and CJN! as focal points of the constituency and scarce resources such as meeting room, office space, access to plenary halls with limited access, or time to take the floor during negotiation sessions have to be shared between the two groups. It is important to note, though, that the composition of and relationship between both networks is dynamic and shifting, and that a substantial overlap of affiliation exists.

Method of Data Collection

This report utilizes three distinct sources of data. First, the author's doctoral research (Holz 2012) employed a multi-year ethnography (2007-2010) of CAN's work at the UNFCCC negotiations during which the author immersed himself in the advocacy work of CAN-I, especially in the context of its Flexible Mechanisms working group. Second, after completion of the PhD field work, the author remained involved in CAN's advocacy work, both in voluntary capacity as well, from 2012-2014, as Executive Director of Climate Action Network Canada, one of the national nodes of CAN-I. While not formally a data collection method for the purpose of this study, this involvement resulted in a wealth of informal insider knowledge about the procedures of CAN that this study draws upon. Third, during the UNFCCC's Climate Conference in Lima, Peru, in December 2014, a number of semi-structured, semi-informal interviews as well as informal conversations with staff of the CAN secretariat, staff of CAN member organizations, as well as the UNFCCC NGO liaison office were conducted to complement the data from the first two sources with data specifically collected for the purpose of this study. In addition, the data is augmented, where appropriate, with relevant official UNFCCC documents as well as documents published on the CAN website and other relevant sources. As a result of the large amount of informally gathered data, data sources will not be referenced except for data taken from published documents.

Internal Structure and Processes of Climate Action Network

CAN Governance, Nodes, Working Groups, and Sources of Funding

Nodes

Climate Action Network is, at the time of writing, a coalition "of civil society organizations, with over 900 member organisations in over 100 countries" (CAN 2014a: 31), these member organizations are organized geographically in 10 regional and 14 national nodes.² Historically, Climate Action Network evolved in the context of the UNFCCC negotiations – tracing its roots all the way back to 1989, just prior to the UN General Assembly's decision to establish negotiations toward the UNFCCC (CAN 2014b) – and as such, most of the activities of Climate Action Network *International* focus on these negotiations³. However, CAN regional and national nodes and their member organizations also engage in substantial regional, national and local advocacy work on climate change. In fact, only a relatively small percentage of overall membership of CAN is actively engaged in the international negotiations, while the majority of the membership focuses on domestic work in their own countries. The share of organizations that do engage in international work is different between nodes and shifts over time and is dependent, for example, on the resources required (or available) for engaging in international advocacy work and on the perceived relevance of international climate politics for the domestic or regional political context of the member organizations. For example, member organizations of Climate Action Network Canada

engaged heavily in the period leading up to and including the Copenhagen Climate Conference in 2009, but interest dropped since as Canadian climate organizations began to focus on provincial and local issues instead of federal and international as they witnessed a disinterest in climate policy of the Canadian federal government – at the December 2014 Climate Conference in Lima, Peru, only 4 out of over 100 member organizations of CAN Canada were represented.

Naturally, this different level of engagement among nodes with the international, as opposed to domestic, climate policy space also implies correspondingly different degrees of different nodes' member organizations' involvement in the formulation of CAN's policy positions with regards to the international climate negotiations. This is in part due to the fact that the technical details and jargon of the international climate are less familiar to organizations that are focusing on other levels of climate advocacy. Another source of an asymmetric level of participation of nodes are the limited resources available to CAN member organizations, as well as the nodes themselves – this will be discussed in some more detail below.

Nodes also differ in their degree of organizational development – a small number of nodes are as old as CAN International itself (CAN 2014b) with own staff and own legal entity while others are more loosely organized with coordination done on a voluntary basis or by staff seconded from member organizations. In addition to the nodes, CAN International operates a secretariat with supports and coordinates the network in policy development, communications, node development and general operation and coordination.

Governance and Membership

CAN is registered as a non-profit organization in Bonn, Germany and is overseen by a board of directors with a varying number of director (currently there are thirteen directors) which is elected at the annual members' meeting. The CAN Charter (CAN 2002) governs, *inter alia*, the role of the board, the relationship between regional and national nodes and CAN itself, CAN's decision making process, the role of issue based working groups, and the process and criteria of obtaining membership. In all bodies, including the board, there is a strong emphasis on maintaining gender and regional balance, in the case of the Annual General Assembly – which is scheduled to concur annually with the UNFCCC COPs – this is most pronounced with a formal requirement for quorum being at least 90% of CAN regional or national nodes and international organizations within CAN represented (an “international organization” is one with offices in more than 20 countries – these organizations are directly members of CAN-I and in a number of ways similar to nodes).

Membership is restricted to “non-government/community-based non-profit organisations, that do not represent industry and which have an interest in [...] climate change issues, are eligible to become members of CAN” (CAN 2002: 8). New members join CAN through the regional or national nodes, unless there is no such node in the country of the prospective member or the prospective members is an “international organization”, in which cases the application is directed to the CAN-I secretariat. As such, nodes are the gatekeeper of membership⁴ and different nodes have slightly different policies with regards to membership in the node. Node membership automatically bestows membership in CAN-I upon an organization, as a result, the total membership of CAN (“over 900 organisations”) is much larger than the much smaller number of CAN member organizations that are working on UNFCCC politics as some organizations that only work on regional or national climate advocacy join CAN nodes.

Box: The Three Settings of CAN's involvement with the UNFCCC

Like many other UN bodies, the negotiations under the UNFCCC are not “continuous negotiations” (Jönsson 2002: 223) but are instead organized into distinct negotiation sessions. Most importantly, these are the annual “COP” climate conferences, two week long sessions at the end of each calendar year, where negotiations are held under the Conference of the Parties, its permanent Subsidiary Bodies, SBI and SBSTA, as well as, since 2005, the Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) and any temporary subsidiary bodies, currently, most notably the ADP. In addition, in the regular negotiation schedule, there are two week long meetings of the Subsidiary Bodies in the middle of the year in Bonn, Germany, where the Headquarters of the UNFCCC are located. In times of heightened negotiation activity, such as the three year period prior to the Copenhagen Climate Conference, or the current period prior to the 2015 Paris COP, additional shorter sessions of the relevant temporary subsidiary bodies are held.

Due to this structure, any members of observer organizations that are engaging the UNFCCC process, like CAN, are typically only physically in the same place for very short periods of time: about 24 days total in “regular” years and up to 57 days in periods with heightened activity (cf. footnote 45, Holz 2012: 100), while for the remainder of the year, CAN members would be located in vastly different locales throughout the world; often having day-to-day work commitments that are not directly related to the UNFCCC process.

As such, it is indicated to differentiate between two main settings of CAN's involvement: the ***in-session setting***, which is characterized by CAN members gathering in the same physical location, focusing their attention specifically to UNFCCC activities and coordination of their efforts within CAN, the presence of UNFCCC negotiators in the same location and allowing for in-person engagement of conflicting views within CAN and in-person coordination efforts within the network. In this setting, CAN can be said to function as a “real world” activist community.

In contrast, the ***virtual setting*** is characterized by CAN members being dispersed widely across the globe, not necessarily focusing their attention exclusively on UNFCCC politics, and, most importantly, not having in-person access to each other and to UNFCCC negotiators for coordination, policy formation and lobbying, respectively. In this setting, CAN functions as a “virtual community”, with an emphasis on electronic means of communication.

There is also value to distinguish a third setting: the ***hybrid setting***, which refers to the fact that typically only a portion of CAN is present at UNFCCC sessions, while another portion of CAN attempts to follow the negotiations as well as the CAN-internal coordination and policy formation processes from their home countries. Importantly, the hybrid setting affords the latter group only a superficial, mediated, and often time-delayed insight into what is happening simultaneously at the UNFCCC session, through webcasts of a selection of negotiation meetings, minutes of CAN meetings and the like. (for a more detailed discussion of these settings, cf. Holz 2012: chapter 3.4 and 5.2)

Working Groups and Internal Communications

Besides being geographically organized into nodes, CAN members also coordinate their collective work through issue-based working groups. These working groups mirror the main strands of discourse of the UNFCCC negotiations. At the time of writing there are 14 working groups, with the most active ones covering the issue of: mitigation, adaptation, effort sharing, finance, technology, LULUCF/REDD, agriculture, flexible mechanisms and legal⁵. In addition, there are short-lived, ad-hoc working groups on issues that are relevant for only a certain period of the negotiations, for example a group that worked on the long-term “shared vision” that was an important area of negotiations in the lead-up to the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Conference and, similarly, currently there is a “Friends of the ADP” working group that focuses on cross cutting issues in the agreement that Parties hope to negotiate by the end of the Paris 2015 climate conference (the “ADP”, or Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform, is the temporary negotiating body under the UNFCCC tasked with preparing this agreement). In addition to the issue-based permanent and temporary working group, CAN also has a communications working group in which the staff or volunteers of CAN member organizations that are responsible for media and communications seek to coordinate their communications efforts. Finally, there is a specific group, the “Political Coordination Group”, or PCG, that has a specific, limited membership that is designed to ensure representation across geographical regions and issue areas, and which is concerned with coordinating political strategy, policy formation and information flows between regions and issue areas (CAN 2009).

The issue-based working groups and the communications working group each typically have two co-coordinators and there is the express goal that these co-coordinators reflect regional balance (in terms of the developing/developed country dichotomy of the UNFCCC) as well as gender balance. Co-coordinators are responsible for ensuring that the work of the working group is carried out by its members, that important deadlines (e.g. for submission of views to the UNFCCC) are observed and for ensuring effective communication of the working group with other areas of CAN, for example by coordinating with other working groups or with the PCG. With the exception of the PCG, all CAN members can become members of any of the other working groups (or, indeed, of multiple working groups). “Becoming a member” of a working group first and foremost consists of being signed up to the dedicated email list that each working group operates. For most of the year – i.e. during the “virtual setting” (cf. Box) – the working groups carry out their main activities on these email lists: members share information, reports, news articles etc. that are relevant to the issue area of their working groups and discuss these items among themselves, analyze relevant positions of Parties as they become available and coordinate and carry out policy formation exercises in the issue area concerned. Often, especially in the immediate lead-up to a COP, working groups also add skype or telephone conferences to their activities in order to accelerate policy formation, plan activities at the upcoming UNFCCC session and coordinate working group inputs into the wider CAN work. The frequency of such telephone conferences depends on the working group in question and range from one-off calls to regularly scheduled meetings, on weekly, bi-weekly or monthly basis for other, more active working groups.

In addition to the working group specific email lists, there is also a general email list, *can-talk*, which is used to general UNFCCC related information sharing and coordination, as well as, importantly, to announce the commencement of a policy formation process in working groups as well as for final vetting of policy positions once the positions have been finalized within the working group in question.

Sources of Funding

Reviewing the available Annual Reports of 2010 to 2013 (CAN 2011, 2012a, 2013a, 2014c) shows a substantial variation in budget size of CAN over the years 2010 to 2013. A substantial drop between 2010 and 2011 from \$1.2m in 2010 to \$786,000 in 2011, with nearly \$500,000 of reduction in grant income, is presumably due to the relative loss of funders' interest in international climate politics after the failure of the 2009 Copenhagen climate talks. Further shrinking to \$606,000 in 2012, the budget recovered to \$945,000 in 2013. Reviewing the sources of incomes, the overwhelming majority of the income (ranging between 92% and 99% in that period) is grant income from philanthropic foundations as well as the Danish government's development agency as the sole governmental source of funding. The remainder of the income are "contributions" – while not specified in detail, it can be assumed from the list of funders in the Annual Reports that these contributions are monetary and in-kind contributions from CAN member organizations. Since CAN International does not have any form of membership fees, any contributions of member organizations are always voluntary in nature.⁶

No published financial records prior to 2010 are available, however, it is clear that the level of funding described above is a relatively recent phenomenon for CAN and that, historically, much less funding was available: until 2003, CAN did not have a single staff person due to lack of financial resources, and the single staff person that was hired in 2003 could not be retained after late 2006 due to fundraising difficulties (CAN 2014b). Only once a full-time director was hired again in 2008, the fundraising has consistently remained at a level to support a secretariat with a number of staff.

CAN's Process For Formulating Shared Positions

One principal *raison-d'être* for CAN is to allow its members to leverage their collective political capital in the UNFCCC process by speaking with a single voice. A necessary condition for this to occur is a process to formulate shared positions within CAN. Typically, such positions are formulated as a result of the UNFCCC's request for submissions of views from Parties and observers (e.g. CAN 2014d, 2014e), but may also include areas where working groups identified a need to have a joint CAN position as a matter of political strategy, in order to facilitate internal discussions, or to have agreed-upon talking points for the purpose of lobbying Party delegations at UNFCCC sessions, independently of a call of submissions from the UNFCCC (e.g. CAN 2013b, 2014f). The annual comprehensive policy documents that CAN publishes prior to each COP also fall into that latter category (e.g. CAN 2012b, 2013c, 2014a).

Typically, as mentioned above, the need for a policy position is identified by a working group, which then informs the whole of CAN, via the CAN-wide *can-talk* email list, of the commencement of a policy formation process by the working group. This is done to ensure that CAN members who are not active in the working group in question, but are interested in participating in, or following, the generation of the specific policy position can temporarily join the working group for that purpose. This is also important since there is an expectation that members who have not raised their objections during the working group phase of the policy formation process would typically refrain from raising objections, or requesting to by-line positions, during the final vetting process on the general CAN-wide email list. The announcement of the start of the policy position formation process also includes the proposed timeline and a reminder of CAN's policy formation process, as outlined above. In the case of more comprehensive and cross-cutting policy positions such as the annual policy documents mentioned above, working

groups develop the portion of the document that falls within their issue area and subsequently all working group portions are assembled and the overall document as well as cross-cutting issues discussed on the general CAN-wide *can-talk* email list.

Depending on the size of the working group, the preferred mode of work of the working group members and the complexity of the issue, the actual policy formation process can take many different forms which may (or may not) include an initial conference call, and/or online discussion to establish the scope of the position, an initial draft written by the co-coordinator(s) or other volunteer members, and subsequently various rounds of collective edits and feedback, again sometimes with or without telephone conferences.

Once finalized by the working group, the policy position is forwarded to the CAN-wide email list for final vetting, after which the policy position is considered adopted by the whole of CAN. As a general rule, and as per the CAN Charter, consensus is the desired mode of decision making within CAN, thus the process of policy position formation is expected to lead to a consensual outcome. The CAN Charter prescribes the use of the concept of “sufficient consensus” as a tool to determine suitable agreement of the CAN membership with a decision. “Sufficient consensus” is described as a situation where “the dissenting view represents less than approximately 5% of the overall size, weight, relevance and particular significance of CAN membership against the issue put forward for decision making” (CAN 2002: 14). This vague formula is prescribed in recognition that “CAN membership is not equally representative of all national, regional and other constituencies, [and that] voting by members will not promote fairness of decision making” (CAN 2002: 14). In the case of CAN policy position formation, if it is the case that full consensus is not possible since, for example, different CAN members strongly hold mutually exclusive beliefs, “by-lining” is chosen as the solution. In that case, a footnote is used to note that some member organizations disagree with parts (or the entirety) of a position paper and their names are listed. This option, however, is only chosen as the last resort and, as mentioned above, it is expected that only member organizations that have engaged in the working group process of formulating the position, and can therefore be considered to have made a bona-fide effort in attempting to find consensus, are eligible for by-lining.

It is important to note that there are, of course, other approaches to formulating joint position papers. For example, a process that is widely used within civil society, especially for more ad-hoc attempts to bundle the political clout of diverse organizations is the “sign-on” letter or statement where only organizations that have explicitly expressed their agreement with the document are listed as supporting the document. This can be described as a process to obtain “explicit consensus” while in contrast, CAN’s approach to consensus on policy positions is one of “assumed consensus” where all member organizations are deemed to be in agreement with a position unless they specifically stated the opposite. Within the UNFCCC policy space, this former approach has been widely used by CJN!, where, at least initially, position papers and submission were always sign-on documents.

Historically, CAN policy position formation has also been described as a “lowest common denominator” approach to the “consensus” concept (e.g. in Holz 2012: 254), where the structure of the policy formation process gave disproportionate gravitas to fringe opinions. This was, for example, experienced in policy formation processes in relation to carbon markets and REDD, where a majority of groups held very critical views with regards to the use of market mechanisms but a small minority successfully prevented rejective positions to be included in the collective position (for a more detailed account, cf. Holz 2012, 2010; or Lohmann 2006). Interestingly, the “lowest

common denominator” approach to consensus decision-making is also the mode of decision-making of the UNFCCC regime itself, where, in absence of agreed-upon rules of procedure for voting, decisions have to be made by consensus. While the specific interpretation of “consensus” is to some degree in the hands of the chair of a specific session (and, indeed, contested instances of interpreting consensus to be different than unanimity exist), generally speaking this situation allows the UNFCCC process to be held hostage by outlier views held strongly only by single countries or small groups of countries.

It is informative to elaborate on the specific advantages and disadvantages of policy formation in the three distinct settings of CAN’s involvement in the UNFCCC process (cf. Box). CAN working groups generally prefer policy formulation in the virtual setting in order to avoid the disadvantages of the alternatives. However, the virtual setting has its own disadvantages, mainly related to the fact that CAN members are located in geographically diverse locations and UNFCCC-related activities only form a portion of the overall work for most of them, making it often hard for members to commit to attending telephone conferences or even providing written comments or edits on drafts of position statements. As a result, policy formation activities within working groups in the virtual session required strong commitment and discipline from both the working group co-coordinators and the members of the group as well as a great deal of flexibility on the part of participants considering the issue of time zones for collaborative work. For example, the core members of the working group that I have been centrally involved in during the last few years are located in California, Ontario, Germany, Denmark, Australia and New Zealand – for telephone conferences to work, the California-based member had to join a conference call at 5am in their time zone while the call began at midnight for the Australia-based member. Furthermore, the costs of joining an international telephone conference can be prohibitive for participants from some countries, or the quality of internet connections do not allow for joining of calls through skype or other internet-based tools. While telephone conferences are not the only means to influence the policy formation process, they often are the spaces where the most controversial issues in the consensus-building process are addressed.

These issues are somewhat overcome in the in-session setting, to the degree that this setting even exists. For most working groups, and certainly for CAN as a whole, the in-session setting typically is in reality a hybrid setting as, safe for small working groups, typically not all members are present at a session. This again, is largely due to lack of resources to enable attendance at the sessions, as well as differing and shifting assessments of the relevance and usefulness of UNFCCC politics to an organization’s mission. In-session policy formation overcomes the disadvantages of the virtual setting by enabling face-to-face interactions of members or working groups, or of CAN members in general. In fact, most CAN working groups hold one hour long meetings daily at the UNFCCC sessions, mainly to coordinate their activities at the session, but also to work on any outstanding policy formation issues. While working face-to-face, and in a situation where no other work requirements besides UNFCCC related activities would interfere, is more efficient than the above described process in the virtual setting, time spent during UNFCCC sessions on internal coordination and policy formation is time lost for following the negotiations between Parties or trying to influence the negotiations. As such, finalizing policy formation during sessions presents a trade off between being able to influencing the negotiations and more effective internal decision making. For that reason, working groups generally strive for finalizing these processes prior to UNFCCC sessions but occasionally leaving crunch issues to be resolved at the sessions. Note that on very few occasions, working groups also organize stand-alone meetings that do not occur in parallel to UNFCCC sessions. For example, in September 2007, immediately

after the UNFCCC negotiation session in Vienna, CAN's LULUCF/REDD working group held a three day work shop in that city to discuss the respective policy positions of their members and plan their work for the immediate future. This model – in-person coordination independent of UNFCCC sessions – overcomes the crucial weaknesses of both the in-session as well as the virtual settings, however it requires additional commitment of resources and is for that reason often not suitable.

Furthermore, for the same reason, CAN has established the practice of holding whole-day internal strategy and coordination meetings on the day prior to the start of any UNFCCC session (CAN 2014b) in order to benefit from the advantages of the in-session setting (chiefly, face-to-face interaction) without suffering from the disadvantages of the setting (loosing time to influence negotiations). Besides general conversation on political strategy, these days also feature conversations on specific “cross-cutting” issues that cut across the issues that specific working groups are working on and that therefore are not specifically in the area of responsibility for any specific working group. The day-long strategy sessions also have time slots set aside for working groups to finalize their coordination and planning for the impending session and, if needed, work on finalizing unfinished policy positions.

It is also important to note that there are barriers to participation for CAN members in all three settings. The most striking of them is the fact that internal deliberations within CAN are held in English only, mirroring the use of English as lingua franca of the UNFCCC negotiations as a whole, thus effectively making participation much more difficult for organizations that cannot effectively participate in this language. The regional and national nodes of CAN are intended to help overcome this barrier by acting as a conduit of information and views between member organizations in their node and the wider CAN network. Further, negotiations under the UNFCCC have matured substantially over the course of time since the Convention was first adopted, resulting in a highly technical use of terminology and jargon, which adds another layer to the language barrier. In addition, and as mentioned, specific settings have specific barriers, for example, the financial resource required to travel to UNFCCC sessions to participate in internal deliberations under the in-session setting as well in the actual UNFCCC negotiations. Not surprisingly, these barriers are disproportionately affecting CAN member organizations in Southern countries (as well as small organizations from the North, for details cf. Duwe 2000) who have difficulties in mobilizing the necessary financial, human and capacity resources to engage effectively and consistently over longer periods of time, especially for the smaller UNFCCC sessions. As a result, and as observed repeatedly (Duwe 2000, 2001; Holz 2012; Waddell 2003; Westerlind-Wigström 2008, 2009), the center of gravity within CAN tends to lie with Northern member organizations rather than Southern, a problem that is well recognized within the network as well and met with genuine efforts to address this imbalance. CAN has a long history of trying to address some of these underlying barriers, for example by raising funds from European governments to enable participation of Southern CAN members at UNFCCC sessions (Duwe 2001) or lobbying for funding of Southern ENGO participants directly through the UNFCCC in a manner similarly to Southern government delegates (the UNFCCC funds participation of one delegate per developing country, or country with an economy in transition, plus a second participant for COPs for least developed countries and small island states, Manful 2005).

Since early 2009, CAN has also engaged in additional, specific efforts to help overcome some of these barriers by establishing the “Southern Capacity Building Program”, which, in the first year of its operation, was able to execute activities worth nearly \$700,000 in donor funds including the funding of a total of 27 individuals to attend UNFCCC sessions

and 7 regional workshops with a combined attendance of nearly 250 individuals from 66 countries (Shukla 2010); in 2011 and 2012 the program represented 42% and 43%, respectively, of CAN's total budget (CAN 2012a, 2013a). This program has since developed further into the "Leadership Development Program [which] works with individuals from CAN member organizations in developing countries to build their professional leadership while strengthening the respective CAN national and regional nodes" (CAN 2014c: 16) (for a more complete discussion of barriers to participation in all three different settings, cf. Holz 2012: chapter 5).

Climate Action Network and the UNFCCC

Managing Scarce Resources, Transmitting Information

CAN is designated by the UNFCCC as one of the focal point organization of the ENGO constituency of observers. Notably, there is no formal process for designating organizations as focal points for constituencies. Essentially, which organization (or, indeed, individual) serves as a focal point is determined by the constituencies themselves on consensus basis and these focal points are then utilized by the secretariat informally as described below. If the secretariat receives any communication objecting the designation of a specific organization or individual as constituency focal point, it would suspend communicating with them until the matter is resolved internally within the constituency. In fact, this is what happened in the case of the ENGO constituency where since 2008 there is strictly speaking no single focal point agreed by the whole constituency and instead there is an informal arrangement in place that the two networks of organizations within this constituency (CAN and CJNI) split engagement opportunities until a permanent solution is found.

The UNFCCC secretariat utilizes focal points as a conduit of information between the secretariat and the observer organizations as well as tasking focal points with the managing of certain scarce resources that are made available to observer organizations in limited quantities. In the former category, the secretariat sends comprehensive informal advance information about upcoming meetings, and logistics associated with these meetings to focal point organizations only, leaving it to these organizations to further distribute relevant parts to the organizations affiliated with the constituency. In CAN's case, the CAN secretariat compiles parts of the information provided, as well as additional relevant information to the activities of CAN at the session (for example, times and locations of the aforementioned day-long strategy sessions, or the contact information of working group co-coordinators) in a "CAN members guide to the session" which is widely distributed among CAN membership. The secretariat highlights however, that the existence of focal point organizations "does not preclude direct communication with the secretariat by any individual observer organization, nor does it imply any sovereignty over the constituency on the part of the focal point organization" (UNFCCC 2014b: 1).

The second main function of the focal point, from the UNFCCC secretariat's point of view, is the managing of scarce resources. At UNFCCC sessions, the secretariat makes dedicated meeting rooms available to the ENGO constituency (as well as some other constituencies) as well as office space at the COPs. The management of bookings for these rooms by organizations affiliated with the ENGO constituency is carried out by the focal organizations. As mentioned, the ENGO constituency is in the unique position to have two focal points, CAN and CJNI, which means that the coordinators of these networks have to coordinate among themselves how to share the joint responsibility of

managing scarce resources. In the case of meeting rooms, for example, at the 2014 COP in Lima, CJNI managed room bookings for ENGOs in the mornings and CAN in the afternoons.

Other scarce resources are access to meeting rooms, or indeed the conference venue, when the secretariat has placed a limit on participation due to rooms or venues reaching over capacity. In those cases, the UNFCCC secretariat issues “secondary badges” which need to be presented in addition to the regular registration badge for the conference in order to gain access to the venue or meeting room. These secondary badges are issued to constituency focal organizations in order to facilitate distribution to their affiliated organizations as they see fit. In the case of the ENGO constituency, both CAN and CJNI receive half of the secondary badges allocated to this constituency for further distribution to their members⁷. The venue-wide secondary badge system has most notoriously been applied at the 2009 COP in Copenhagen, where only 300 secondary badges were issued to the over 13,000⁸ non-governmental observers for the final two days of the conference (McGregor 2011). Likewise, during a number of UNFCCC sessions, access to some meeting rooms is restricted through a secondary badge system. This applies now, for example, routinely to the opening and closing plenaries at COPs, where a secondary badge is required to access the plenary hall, or to negotiations that are met by high observer interest but are not held in large enough rooms. At the time of writing, this is frequently the case for meetings of the contact group under the ADP, where access management seems to alternate between a “first-come-first-served” approach (resulting in long lines of waiting observers outside of meeting rooms) on one hand and a secondary badge system (resulting in frustration for those who had not had a chance to access such a badge).

Focal point organizations are also utilized by the UNFCCC secretariat to manage observer access to special invite-only workshops that are held on expert topics from time to time between sessions and for which non-governmental experts can be proposed by focal point organizations only but not by observer organizations directly.

Finally, the UNFCCC secretariat also uses focal point organizations to manage access to the floor of the negotiations; focal point organizations are tasked with managing the very limited opportunities for observers to give interventions during the proceedings – usually, these opportunities are limited to tokenistic short statements during the opening and closing plenaries of each negotiating body and this topic will be discussed in more detail below. ENGO focal points also play a role in negotiating with the secretariat the various specifics of actions and demonstrations inside the conference venue, again, to be discussed in more detail below.

Two important areas of observer engagement in the UNFCCC process remain where the UNFCCC secretariat does not utilize focal point organizations to manage them: side events, exhibits and written submissions. For side events and exhibits (booths at the conference venue), any observer organization has to apply directly to the secretariat which then allocates these resources directly after an opaque vetting process. Written submissions are generally accepted by observer organizations on any topic that parties’ submissions were invited, even if the text of the call for submissions (usually in a decision by the COP, the CMP, or one of the subsidiary bodies) does not specifically invite observer submissions. These submissions are then posted in a dedicated section of the UNFCCC website; there does not appear to be any vetting process.

Lastly, it is important to note that CAN (and CJNI) are dissimilar from the focal point organizations of the other nodes in that these two networks, but in particular CAN, make

specific and far-reaching efforts to speak with one voice in the context of the UNFCCC, while other constituency focal points merely coordinate and disseminate information. In the case of CAN, this is further compounded by the fact that CAN has its own legal persona as an organization and that the organizations that are affiliated with CAN in its function as a focal point of the ENGO constituency under the UNFCCC also have a formal relationship with CAN that transcends the context of the UNFCCC – namely, as members of CAN-I and/or one of its regional or national nodes.

Managing Stakeholder Engagement

As mentioned throughout this report, there are a variety of ways in which stakeholders are engaging with the UNFCCC process. The previous section considered how the UNFCCC secretariat utilizes constituency focal point organizations to indirectly discharge some of its responsibilities to manage these opportunities for engagements. The following section will discuss some of these areas of stakeholder engagements in more detail, paying particular attention to cases where the relevant practices have changed over time, have been challenged by observers and/or parties, or where asymmetries in participation exist.

The most fundamental pre-condition for effective stakeholder engagement is access to the places where the negotiations are held. Here, issues exist with two types of access: first, access to the conference venues, and second, access to the rooms in which negotiations take place. In Copenhagen the access restrictions for observers were very severe and resulted in severe backlash from observers, including claims of disenfranchisement (McGregor 2011), numerous media stories (e.g. Vidal and Watts 2009) and recommendations for improvements from another UN treaty process (UNECE 2010).⁹ Possibly as a result of the outcry over access restrictions in Copenhagen, the UNFCCC secretariat has since moved to a system where access to the conferences is restricted from the outset: after nominating individuals through an online system, observer organizations receive an allotment of access slots that they can assign to the nominated individuals. However, overall the allotment is much smaller than the number of nominated individuals, with the severity of restrictions differing widely between organizations (receiving less than 10% of requested slots is not uncommon) and allocation being carried out according to an opaque formula within the secretariat. Besides the aforementioned decline in interest in the UNFCCC process after the perceived failure of Copenhagen, these restrictions, and the selection of smaller venues, have arguably had a substantial impact on the declining numbers of observer registrations. This form of access control is less apparent than the previously used secondary badge system and it also does not result in the same degree of outcry of those observers that have travelled to the conference only to be access denied, however, it still has the same limiting effect on stakeholder.

In addition to venue-wide limits on access, access to certain specific rooms within the negotiations is also routinely limited. For example, secondary badge system is typically in place for the opening ceremonies and/or opening plenaries as well as parts or entirety of the high-level segments. These restrictions, however, have less impact on the quality of stakeholder engagement as these sessions are open sessions and as such are available as webcast live and as on-demand video later. However, there are other types of negotiation meetings where access restrictions exist without the remedying effects of broadcasting. Specifically, contact groups that are routinely established by plenary to deal with specific issues are in principle open to observers, however, the practice has been established that only the first and last meeting of a series of meetings of a contact

group is open to observers and the actual substantial discussions of the group are carried out under exclusion of observers, as the first meeting usually merely establishes the context and mandate of the group and the last meeting is used to distribute the text that has already been agreed upon during the exclusive prior meetings. While this practice is in compliance with the UNFCCC's Draft Rules of Procedure (UNFCCC 1996) and the relevant interpreting COP decision (UNFCCC 1998), according to which observers should be allowed to attend contact groups unless at least a third of Parties or the presiding officer decides otherwise, it is customarily applied now in a blanket fashion without parties or presiding officers necessarily engaging in any appreciable decision making process. Since contact groups are among the most important loci of deliberation within the UNFCCC process, these restrictions impact severely on the quality of observer engagement, who instead of their own observations must rely on third-party accounts of the deliberations in such closed sessions.

Another type of access restrictions, which was already referred to above, occurs when negotiation meetings are held in rooms that are no suitable size match for the amount of observer interest in the meeting in question. This occurred both at the Warsaw 2013 and the Lima 2014 COPs in the case of the contact group under the ADP, where access was granted on a first-come-first-served basis which led to numerous occasions of long lines of observers outside of meeting rooms in hope of gaining access when individuals currently in the room would leave. For the same contact group, during the June 2014 inter-sessional session in Bonn, the secretariat temporarily established a secondary badge system to allocate a very limited number of seats for observers, before a collective outcry of some Parties and observers led to the deliberations being moved to a larger room. This highlights one example in which the successful cooperation of observers with Parties that have genuine interest in effective observer participation can lead to improved access. In general, over time, it can be concluded that observer access both to the venue itself as well as to specific negotiating spaces within the larger sessions has deteriorated within the UNFCCC system.

A possible partial solution, which can also be unilaterally applied by Parties more concerned about adequate observer access, is to place observer delegates on the own government delegation, which effectively exempts them from any restrictions placed upon observers by the UNFCCC. This has been practiced in the past to varying degrees by a number of countries (cf., for example, Duwe 2001; Holz 2012; McGregor 2011), and is recommended as a solution by the working group of the Aarhus Convention (UNECE 2010). However, since such arrangements typically come with new restrictions on the type of activities that observers thus accredited can engage in (in some cases, these individuals are, for example, not allowed to speak to media as they might be misperceived as representing official government position), this solution comes with its own set of pitfalls.

Verbal statements during the proceedings of the UNFCCC ("interventions") are another medium through which observers could contribute their views to the deliberations. However, interventions for observers are currently extremely limited and merely of a tokenistic nature. While in the past, it was occasionally possible for observers to intervene during contact groups on specific items (Holz 2012; UNFCCC 2004), current practice sees observer interventions only permitted in the opening and closing plenaries of each negotiating stream, only at the end of these plenaries, only if there is time for the interventions and only for extremely short statements – two minutes per constituency, which in the case of the ENGO constituency means one minute each for CAN and CJN! While there have been minor improvements to this practice on the occasion of the closing plenary of the ADP during that Lima 2014 climate conference¹⁰, observer

interventions hastily made on the fringes of the conference can at most create the impression of inclusion, but can hardly be considered genuine stakeholder inclusion, in particular since this very small window to access the floor is typically the only opportunity to contribute to the verbal deliberations.¹¹

Submissions of written views of observers are another means through which observers seek to influence the negotiations and, arguably, an area where observer access has improved over time: During the lead-up to the Copenhagen climate conference, observer submissions were generally only allowed where specifically requested: an analysis of the decision texts of one of the negotiating bodies of that period showed that these requests were very rare: between 2005 and 2009, 27 out of 29 requests for submissions were for parties only; only one for “parties and observers” and one for “parties and relevant organizations” (Holz 2012: 175–6). CAN, however, has traditionally also made submissions for “parties only” requests, often with the result of having the submission published on the UNFCCC website. Currently, in contrast, submissions are explicitly invited from observer organizations on any topic that submission are requested from Parties and publication on the UNFCCC website, in a dedicated portal for observer submissions, happens by default; the UNFCCC even invites submissions from interested organizations that are not accredited as observers with the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2013).

However, while the inclusiveness of the invitation to submit and the initial treatment of the submission have arguably improved, the actual *use* of these observer inputs has not. For example, while in the past, text from observer submissions was occasionally found in INF documents prepared by the secretariat to synthesize submissions made on a certain topic, observer submissions appear now generally ignored in the official process, besides potentially informing the position formation of Parties that have accessed them. In contrast, presiding officers of negotiation bodies and the UNFCCC secretariat could also include views submitted by observers when summarizing the breadth of views present within the negotiations. Additionally, in 2014, in the context of rolling out a new web portal for accessing submissions made by Parties, observer submissions were left in the old portal, effectively making them more obscure to find than previously.

One area of frustration with observer organizations, that is repeatedly quoted, is the lack of transparency with regards to the rules and procedures applied. This was already mentioned in the context of accessing proceedings of some contact groups, as well as the quota allocation for accessing conference venues, which is done in a non-transparent and seemingly non-uniform manner. Other such areas are consequences for unapproved, or allegedly unapproved, activities in the conference venue, the policies for approving actions in the first place, access to conference documents, to name a few.

Generally speaking, “non-governmental observers shall refrain from using the UNFCCC venues for unauthorized demonstrations” (UNFCCC 2003: 5). However, the history of observer engagement in the UNFCCC process is abound with examples of such unauthorized activities (cf, for example, the images in CAN 2014b) that were tolerated by the UNFCCC secretariat and UN security. As such, any strict interpretation of this rule appears to be in contradiction with previous practice and, at times, responses by the secretariat and/or UN security are seen at draconian.¹² Such unauthorized activities can range from activists chaining themselves to the plenary doors at the 2001 The Hague COP (Holz 2012) at one extreme end of the spectrum, to youth activists unfurling banners or holding spontaneous press conferences in hall ways of the venue (Petermann 2012), to placing brochures at non-designated locations, on the other extreme. Responses can range from life-time bans of the activists in question and severe restrictions for the accrediting organization in the first case, to eviction and withdrawal

of access badged (“debadging”) for the remainder of the current COP. While there is a process of getting certain actions approved for inside the venue, there is a frustration that this process in itself impedes with one of the function of civil society, to hold power accountable. Frustration also exists about the perceived increasing “repression” (Petermann 2012) of such action within the UNFCCC regime and increased application of a zero-tolerance policy. On the other hand, UNFCCC secretariat staff is quick to point out, that the freedoms that observer organizations enjoy in that regard in the UNFCCC process are much greater than in other UN bodies and agencies; for example, it is pointed out that at the UN Headquarters no T-shirts, buttons, etc with organizational logos or political statements would be allowed to be worn while such sights are routine at the UNFCCC sessions.

Since the ENGO constituency (together with YUNGO) are the most likely constituencies to desire staging actions within the conference venues, CAN, as a focal point organization, is involved with negotiating this area of conflict with the UNFCCC secretariat, for example, by applying for approval of actions that its member organizations seek to organize or by lobbying on behalf of individuals or member organizations that have been penalized, and finally by trying to improve the rule base by seeking clarification and transparency and demanding leniency in the rules. CAN also has a firmly established, daily instance of actions inside the conference venue: since 1999, it’s daily “Fossil of the Day” mock award presentation highlights the three countries that have done their most to block progress in the preceding 24 hours (CAN 2014b). The loud, controversial and confrontational character of this daily event arguably also contributed to a sense among activists what type of actions should be permissible within the UNFCCC venue.

One illustrative example of the effects of unclear and opaque rules is the development over time of access to in-session documents by observers. At the beginning of this author’s involvement with the UNFCCC process, access to in-session documents (i.e. draft versions of decision text) was restricted. However, upon CAN’s inquiring about which rules prevented observer access to documents, the UNFCCC secretariat referred to the co-chairs of the relevant negotiation body having made this decision, while, in separate meetings, the co-chairs explained that this decision was the secretariat’s. On the occasion of one meeting between the co-chairs and observers, with relevant secretariat staff present, these conflicting accounts were confronted and the access restrictions subsequently lifted.

Further inquiry revealed that the co-chairs had made a decision to restrict document access for one past session only and that this decision had since been applied by the secretariat for all future sessions. It is important to note that no central repository of such rules and decisions appears to exist, with the exception of a paper binder maintained by the NGO liaison office of the UNFCCC secretariat which contains all the formal decision of the COP, and its subsidiary bodies with regards to the engagement of observer organizations, but which does not collect the informal decisions taken by the secretariat or presiding officers on a more ad-hoc basis. As such, practices based on such informal decisions appear arbitrary, non-transparent, and unfounded, and are therefore harder to challenge than if their origins were known.

As mentioned, CAN, in its function as focal point organization, negotiates with the UNFCCC secretariat on issues of contention. On various occasions, Parties that are sympathetic to the concerns of observers for adequate venues of participation have proven to be important allies in these negotiations. For example, in June 2014, the secretariat decided to impose a \$1,000 fee as “partial cost recovery solution” (UNFCCC

2014d) for side events at UNFCCC sessions. The ensuing outcry from the observer constituencies, in particular the ENGO observers, and, crucially, requests from Parties to withdraw this decision, led to the secretariat initiating a consultative process on the matter and subsequently abandoning the proposal. Likewise, as increasing implementation of “PaperSmart” solutions at UNFCCC sessions, resulted in the secretariat requesting CAN to abandon producing a hard copy version of its daily newsletter, Eco, which is very widely read among delegates. However, requests from Parties, especially developing country parties with less availability of handheld electronic devices required for seamless access to electronic versions of Eco, led the secretariat to permit the continuation of the production of a paper Eco. Finally, during the June 2014 Bonn session, Party delegates ensured access for observer delegates to informal consultations on REDD by refusing to participate in those consultations themselves unless observers were also allowed into the room (CAN 2014g).

Conclusions

The study focused on Climate Action Network’s engagement in the UNFCCC negotiating process. In the first half of the main section of the study, the internal structures (regional and national nodes, working groups) and processes of CAN were discussed, with particular emphasis on the efforts to develop joint policy positions and shared strategies. In this context, the processes that structure these efforts were outlined, and barriers that can impede participation of some CAN member organizations were outlined. A detailed account of the three identified contextual settings of CAN activity, in-session, virtual, and hybrid (cf. Box), was provided and a through discussion of the relative disadvantages and advantages of focusing policy formation activities in either one of them was undertaken. While dependent on the specific case at hand, generally speaking the virtual setting is to be preferred as it lacks the specific disadvantage of the in-session setting to directly and adversely impact advocacy effectiveness at UNFCCC sessions. However, policy formation in the virtual setting requires strong coordination and deeply committed participants.

The second half of the main part of the report focused on the relationship between CAN, as one of the constituency focal point organizations, and the UNFCCC secretariat. First, the role of focal point organizations in disseminating information to their affiliated organizations as well as managing scarce resources were discussed. The scarce resources that are being discussed are secondary access badges, intervention opportunities, office space and meeting room bookings, etc. Attention was then turned to areas where most tensions exist between observers and the UNFCCC secretariat. In particular, the section focused on the frustrating experiences for observers that, over time their mere access to the proceedings is getting more and more restrictive, that punishments for unauthorized actions are getting more and more draconian, or that transparency and predictability of rules is lacking in many areas. However, it was also shown that targeted and well-informed push backs, either without or with the help of allied Parties, can help alleviating some of these concerns. As examples, I detailed the changes to the document access policy, the cost recovery policy for side events, access to meeting rooms, and the continuation of Eco in paper format. More attention was also given to the practice of “debadging”. As an overriding concern, the relative lack of clear, predictable and transparent rules for many aspects of observer engagement was quoted as the source of much frustration.

Policy Recommendations

Based on the lessons learned from the preceding discussions, the following policy recommendations are provided in two categories and justifications are given for each of the recommendations.

The following first category covers recommendations that are relevant for the relationship between an UN body and a focal point organization, assuming the latter is interested in the broadest and most effective participation in the deliberations of the former.

1. Establish and maintain an expectation for, and a record of, clear and transparent decision making by the UN body with regards to observer engagement.

As discussed above, the myriad of official decisions by Parties, informal decisions by presiding officers or the secretariat, results in situation of uncertainty about the rules of engagement in the process. It is thus recommended that a focal point organization would establish and maintain its own record of these decisions, including their nature (official vs ad-hoc, temporary vs permanent) in order to facilitate clarity and to allow challenging, for example, the continued application of a temporary route.

2. Demand and defend a status of observer interventions and submissions that is as far as possible identical to those of Parties.

While not practiced in the UNFCCC, this tactic ensures an official venue for the consideration of stakeholder input in the negotiations of the UN body.

3. Cultivate relationships with Parties which are genuinely interested in effective stakeholder participation (champions).

In some of the examples above, it became clear that changes in the way that observers engage this process is firmly based on parties' decisions and preferences. It thus makes sense to cultivate relationships with such champions early, in order to be able draw upon that.

The second category of recommendations below deals with issues that can arise for the focal point organization if the organization also intends to coordinate the formation of joint policy positions and strategies among observer organizations.

1. Be mindful of imbalances in participation in internal deliberations, based on geographic location, size, organizational focus and access to material resources; plan specific steps to overcome these barriers.

As discussed above, the imbalances between Northern and Southern observers are striking and run deep. While these are symptoms of larger geo-political configurations, and therefore not addressable at their roots in the context of stakeholder engagement in the UN climate process, these imbalances can substantially impact the tone, content and policy prescriptions of the internal discussions and therefore specific steps should be identified, planned, carried out, and evaluated to minimize these impacts.

2. Focal organizations should select a specific, and explicit, mode for consensus in decision making on internal and external documents.

Consensus modes can be distinguished, among other criteria, by whether they presume tacit agreement, unless notified otherwise, or only consider organizations supporting a policy statement that have, in fact, signed on to a statement. Similarly, a consensus can be operationalized as being based on the “lowest common denominator” – such a positions where no objections have been registered, or it can be based on more sophisticated methods of consensus making where the views of a large majority prevail over the vetoing attempts of fringe actors.

3. If the area of work is complex and if there are sub-areas that are distinct from the remainder of the issue, working groups should be considered to break the overall task in smaller, more manageable sub aspects.
4. For collective decision making, it is important that participants in the decision making or policy formulation process are aware of the anticipated timelines and means in which to contribute to the process.

This is particularly important if the selected mode of consensus building is one where consensus is assumed if a participating organization has not raised any objections to the positions being developed. Agreement of the organization can only be reasonably assumed in this case, if it was clear how the organization could influence, or ultimately block, the decision to go ahead.

5. Organizations that engage in internal policy formation and coordination processes as well as advocacy work in non-continuous negotiating processes, should, as a default, attempt to carry out as much internal deliberative and coordination as possible in the virtual setting (cf. Box), while remaining vigilant about the potential negative impacts of this setting. If the necessary additional resources exist, stand-alone coordination meetings or workshops can be held to overcome the principal disadvantages of both virtual and in-session settings.

As described in length, the virtual setting has the disadvantage that policy formation in such a setting requires strong coordination and leadership as well as firm commitment to the deliberations by its participants. While these disadvantages can easily cause the policy formation process to fail, the obvious alternative, to carry out policy formation activities during negotiation sessions, can severely and adversely impact the organizations’ advocacy effectiveness. If the necessary resources are available, organizing dedicated meetings independent of the sessions of the negotiating process in question is likely the best choice, as it allows for in-person deliberations of positions while avoiding the negative impact on advocacy effectiveness that the in-session setting would entail.

Notes

- 1 A more detailed analysis of the relative size of the constituencies during the UNFCCC negotiation sessions in 2008 and 2009 (Holz 2012: 163, table 2) clearly shows that by far the largest constituency is the ENGO constituency, and that there is a substantial difference between the annual Conferences of the Parties (COPs) and the

smaller intersessional meetings with regards to relative size of the constituencies and the number of participants from developing countries (which are relatively more often attending COPs). Crucially, the data also shows that there are a sizable number of participants not associating themselves with a constituency (around 350 individuals at both 2007 Bali and 2009 Copenhagen COPs, representing 7.2% and 2.8% of all non-governmental observers, respectively), especially from organizations headquartered in developing countries.

- 2 The regional nodes are Europe; Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia; Western Africa; Maghreb; Eastern Africa; Southern Africa; Pacific; South Asia; Southeast Asia; and Latin America. The national nodes are United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, France, Uganda, Tanzania, South Africa, Australia, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Indonesia, China, and Japan.
- 3 More recently, CAN International's activities started to expand beyond the UNFCCC negotiations, for example supporting member organizations in communications associated with the release of the installments of the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC throughout 2013 and 2014, advocacy activities in connection to the Rio+20 conference or the post-2015 SDG process, or in beginning to coordinate across local and national campaigns on renewable energy. See the overview of CAN International's 2013-2015 strategic directions in the 2013 Annual Report (CAN 2014c: 5). However, since this is a fairly recent development and since the focus of this report is the work associated with the UNFCCC negotiations, these activities will not be further discussed.
- 4 Even though the CAN Charter provides for an appeals procedure in case a node refuses membership, this procedure has never been utilized so far and it is improbable that the CAN-I board would override a regional or national node's decision on a membership application.
- 5 "LULUCF/REDD" is the working group on forestry issues in the climate negotiations; "Flexible Mechanisms" works on the "market mechanisms" under the Kyoto Protocol and beyond, in other words on the various existing and proposed forms of carbon trading. For a full list of working groups, refer to <http://climatenetwork.org/working-groups>
- 6 CAN's regional and national nodes are financially independent from CAN. While CAN *International* does not levy membership dues, many nodes do. These membership fees, where applicable, differ broadly and are often indexed against a membership organization's financial capacity to contribute to the CAN node's budget. For example, in Canada, membership fees range from \$40 per year for small organizations to \$5,000 for organizations with budgets for more than \$1m, with provisions for reduced fees due to financial hardship in place (CAN-Rac Canada 2005). The budget size and overall budget composition also greatly differs between nodes: while the most established nodes, like CAN Europe have budgets that exceed that of CAN International (in 2013, CAN Europe's budget was about \$1.6m (CAN Europe 2014), compared to CAN International's \$945,000), many nodes in developing countries have no dedicated budget at all. Regarding composition, CAN Australia, for example, has a relatively high share of membership contributions (about one third in 2010 and 2011; CAN Australia 2011), while the Canadian node's share is closer to CAN International's (91% in 2011 and 89% in 2012; CAN-Rac Canada 2012).

- 7 This also highlights why, despite not being a formal requirement, affiliation to an observer constituency is of definite value to organizations: unaffiliated observer organizations have no access to any of the resources the distribution of which the UNFCCC secretariat manages through the focal points.
- 8 The actual number of registered non-governmental observers was likely higher: in response to these access limitations, several governments decided to register NGO delegates from their own country with their government delegations, which were not subject to the access restrictions, in order to allow continued access to their observer organizations to the UNFCCC negotiations. This number has been suggested to be as high as 2,500 (McGregor 2011), thus lowering the number of registered observers in the UNFCCC participants list by that amount.
- 9 The cited conclusions of the 2010 workshop of the Aarhus Convention (UNECE 2010) are worth considering in detail as they make specific suggestions on how to improve stakeholder engagement under the UNFCCC which can be applied to many other UN bodies as well.
- 10 In Lima, first, the observer interventions were moved to occur after interventions from groups of parties but before interventions from individual parties. Second, due to an effort on the part of the CAN secretariat to coordinate a joint intervention from multiple constituencies, which also allowed this intervention to take up the cumulative time allotted for all these constituencies, the time constraints were less acute in this instance.
- 11 This also applies to other, less formal, fora within the UNFCCC negotiating process, for example the various in-session workshops that are held by the UNFCCC from time to time, or the recent Technical Expert Meetings, or the proceedings of the “Multilateral Assessment Process” which have commenced in Lima. All of these fora could benefit from the contributions of observers, many of which recognized experts in their fields, but none includes a process for allowing observers to speak, not even during planned question and answer periods. There are some very rare exceptions to this rule on the fringes of the UNFCCC ecosystem; for example, task forces of the Technology Executive Committee of the UNFCCC routinely include observer representatives (UNFCCC 2014c) and the Advisory Board of the Climate Technology Centre and Network includes non-voting members from observer organizations.
- 12 The internet is teeming with accounts of activists that had experienced such responses, for a selection, cf. <http://google.com?q=UNFCCC+debadged>

List of Acronyms and Glossary

ADP

The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action is a subsidiary body under the COP of the UNFCCC which was established at the Durban 2011 COP and is tasked with developing the new climate agreement that Parties to the UNFCCC intend to complete at the Paris 2015 COP.

BINGO

Business and Industry Non-Governmental Organizations is one of the observer constituencies of the UNFCCC process which represents the interests of various industry groups.

CAN/CAN-I

Climate Action Network International is a network of over 900 (in 2014) NGOs worldwide which are working on climate change policy and primarily originate from the environmental and more recently developmental movements. The acronyms CAN and CAN-I are used interchangeably in this report. Unless otherwise stated (e.g. CAN Europe), the acronym CAN always refers to CAN International.

CJN!

Climate Justice Now! is a network of environmental NGOs active at the UNFCCC negotiations that was established in 2008. CJN! emphasizes a climate-justice perspective in the negotiations.

CMP

The Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties of the Kyoto Protocol is the main decision making body with respect to the Kyoto Protocol. As the name suggests, it meets in parallel to the meetings of the COP.

Convention

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC.

COP

The Conference of the Parties is the highest decision making body of the UNFCCC. All parties to the UNFCCC have a vote in the decisions of the COP, however, due to an on-going inability of the Parties to agree on voting procedures, the COP does not have agreed Rules of Procedure and thus decision making is by consensus.

ENGO

Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations is one of the observer constituencies of the UNFCCC process, which represent the international environmental movement's concerns at the negotiations.

Intersessionals

Intersessionals are UNFCCC negotiation sessions that take place during the period between the annual COPs. During intersessionals, the work of the permanent Subsidiary Bodies and Ad-Hoc Groups (e.g. ADP) is advanced.

IPO

Indigenous Peoples' Organizations is one of the observer constituencies of the UNFCCC process, which represent the concerns of Indigenous Peoples at the negotiations.

LGMA

Local Governments and Municipal Authorities is one of the observer constituencies of the UNFCCC process. This constituency consists of representatives of local, municipal, regional and other subnational governments and their associations.

LULUCF

The issue area of Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry within the negotiations of the UNFCCC deals with changes of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere caused by the various ways in which land is used, this land use is changed and by forestry as a specific type of land use. Unlike other issue areas, LULUCF deals not only with emissions from these activities but also with removals of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere through land use activities, for example as carbon dioxide is absorbed by growing trees.

PCG

CAN's Political Coordination Group has a specific, limited membership that is designed to ensure representation across geographical regions and issue areas, and is concerned with coordinating political strategy, policy formation and information flows between regions and issue areas.

REDD

Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (in developing countries). Since these emissions represent approximately 20% of all anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, REDD has become an important part of the UN system's response to climate change.

RINGO

Research and Independent Non-Governmental Organizations is one of the observer constituencies of the UNFCCC process, which mainly consists of representatives of universities, think tanks, and research institutes.

SBI

The Subsidiary Body on Implementation assists the COP in reviewing and assessing technical and practical specifics related to the implementation of the UNFCCC.

SBSTA

The Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice assists the COP by thoroughly reviewing technical and scientific questions referred to it by the COP as well as other relevant scientific and technological developments.

Subsidiary Bodies

Collective term referring to the SBI and the SBSTA.

TUNGO

Trade Union Non-Governmental Organizations is one of the observer constituencies of the UNFCCC process, which represents the interests of workers and the international labour movement at the UNFCCC negotiations.

UNCED

The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, also known as the “Earth Summit,” is mainly known for the “Agenda 21” declaration as well as the adoption of the UNFCCC, and its “sister conventions, the Convention on Biodiversity and the Convention to Combat Desertification.

UNFCCC

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change has been adopted at the UNCED in 1992 and since then grown to universal membership. The convention’s ultimate objective is to limit anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions to a level where dangerous interference with the Earth’s climate system can be avoided. The acronym UNFCCC also refers to the on-going treaty negotiations concerning the implementation of that objective as well as the institutional system of subsidiary bodies, conferences, bureaus and the UNFCCC secretariat in Bonn, Germany.

YOUNGO

Youth Non-Governmental Organizations is one of the observer constituencies of the UNFCCC process. It represents the specific concerns of young people at the UNFCCC negotiations.

References Cited

- Bodansky, Daniel (2010) "The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem" in *The American Journal of International Law*, 104(2), 230–240. [doi: 10.5305/amerjintelaw.104.2.0230]
- CAN (2002) *Climate Action Network Charter. Our Network Rules and Guiding Principles for Network Governance*. [Retrieved: January 14, 2009 from <http://www.climatenetwork.org/about-can/CANCHARTER.pdf>]
- CAN (2009) *Suggested Terms of Reference for CAN Political Coordination Group (PCG)*. [http://climatenetwork.org/sites/default/files/TOR_PCG_Final_0.pdf]
- CAN (2011) *Climate Action Network International Annual Report 2010*. Washington, DC: Climate Action Network International. [Retrieved: September 18, 2014 from http://www.climatenetwork.org/sites/default/files/Can_Annual_Reports_web_spread.pdf]
- CAN (2012a) *Climate Action Network International Annual Report 2011*. Washington, DC: Climate Action Network International. [Retrieved: September 18, 2014 from http://climatenetwork.org/sites/default/files/CAN_2011_Annual_Report.pdf]
- CAN (2012b) *Doha Milestones and Action*. Beirut: CAN International. [Retrieved: December 10, 2012 from http://climatenetwork.org/sites/default/files/doha_final_web.pdf]
- CAN (2013a) *Climate Action Network International Annual Report 2012*. Beirut: Climate Action Network International. [Retrieved: November 10, 2013 from http://climatenetwork.org/sites/default/files/can_2012_annual_report.pdf]
- CAN (2013b) *The Core Convention-Based Equity Indicators*. Beirut: Climate Action Network International. [<http://climatenetwork.org/publication/can-core-convention-based-equity-indicators>]
- CAN (2013c) *Warsaw: On the Road to Paris*. Beirut: CAN International. [Retrieved: November 2, 2013 from http://climatenetwork.org/sites/default/files/warsaw_final_web_0.pdf]
- CAN (2014a) *Lima: Raising the Curtain on Paris*. Beirut: Climate Action Network International. [Retrieved: November 24, 2014 from http://climatenetwork.org/sites/default/files/lima_english_web.pdf]
- CAN (2014b) *Small Window, Bright Light: A History of CAN*. Beirut: Climate Action Network International. [Retrieved: July 1, 2014 from http://climatenetwork.org/sites/default/files/can_history_booklet_web.pdf]
- CAN (2014c) *Climate Action Network International Annual Report 2013*. Beirut: Climate Action Network International. [Retrieved: September 18, 2014 from http://climatenetwork.org/sites/default/files/can_2013_annual_report_web_0.pdf]

CAN (2014d) "Equity Under the ADP: Submission to the Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action". [Retrieved: June 9, 2014 from <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2014/smsn/ngo/440.pdf>]

CAN (2014e) "Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC): Submission to the Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action". [Retrieved: October 24, 2014 from <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2014/smsn/ngo/475.pdf>]

CAN (2014f) *Long Term Global Goals for 2050: Phase Out All Fossil Fuel Emissions and Phase in 100 % Renewable Energy for All*. Beirut: CAN International. [Retrieved: June 13, 2014 from http://climatenetwork.org/sites/default/files/can_position-long_term_global_goals_for_2050.pdf]

CAN (2014g) "ECO, SB40/ADP 2.5 Edition, Issue June 14". [<http://www.climatenetwork.org/sites/default/files/ECOCOP15-4.pdf>]

CAN Australia (2011) *Climate Action Network Australia Financial Statements 2011*. Melbourne: Climate Action Network Australia. [Retrieved: September 18, 2014 from <http://www.cana.net.au/sites/default/files/CANA%20Audited%20Accounts%20FY1011.pdf>]

CAN Europe (2014) *Climate Action Network Europe Annual Report 2013*. Brussels: Climate Action Network Europe. [Retrieved: September 18, 2014 from http://caneurope.org/resources/doc_download/2434-annual-report-2013]

CAN-Rac Canada (2005) "Join Climate Action Network Canada". [Retrieved: August 10, 2011 from <http://www.climateactionnetwork.ca/e/about/members/index.php>]

CAN-Rac Canada (2012) *Climate Action Network Canada - Réseau action climat Canada. Annual Report 2011/2012*. Ottawa: Climate Action Network Canada - Réseau action climat Canada. [Retrieved: September 18, 2014 from <http://climateactionnetwork.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/CAN-Rac-Annual-Report-2011-2012.pdf>]

Dimitrov, Radoslav S. (2010) "Inside Copenhagen: The State of Climate Governance" in *Global Environmental Politics*, 10(2), 18–24. [doi: 10.1162/glep.2010.10.2.18]

Duwe, Matthias (2000) *International NGOs and Climate Politics: Disputes and Bridges between North and South*. MSc Thesis Development Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS).

Duwe, Matthias (2001) "The Climate Action Network: A Glance behind the Curtains of a Transnational NGO Network" in *Review of European Community and International Environment Law (RECIEL)*, 10(2), 177–189. [doi: 10.1111/1467-9388.00274]

Greenpeace International (2009) "Copenhagen a Cop-Out: A Shameful Failure to Save Us from the Effects of Climate Change". [Retrieved: January 28, 2015 from

<http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/features/copenhagen-wrap-up-191209/>]

Holz, Christian (2010) "Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Partizipation – CDM-Kritik in den UN-Klimaverhandlungen" in *Der Klimawandel – Sozialwissenschaftliche Perspektiven*, edited by Martin Voss, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 117–131.

Holz, Christian (2012) *The Public Spheres of Climate Change Advocacy Networks: An Ethnography of Climate Action Network International Within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)*. PhD Thesis. University of Glasgow, Glasgow. [<http://theses.gla.ac.uk/3696/>]

Jönsson, Christer (2002) "Diplomacy, Bargaining and Negotiation" in *Handbook of International Relations*, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen and Beth A. Simmons, London: SAGE Publications, pp. 212–234.

Lohmann, Larry (2006) "Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatisation and Power" in *Development Dialogue*, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, (48). [Retrieved: November 14, 2007 from <http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/summary.shtml?x=544225>]

Manful, George (2005) "Capacity-Building Initiatives to Implement the Climate Change Convention in Africa" in *Climate Change and Africa*, edited by Pak Sum Low, Cambridge University Press, pp. 285–309.

McGregor, Ian M. (2011) "Disenfranchisement of Countries and Civil Society at COP-15 in Copenhagen" in *Global Environmental Politics*, 11(1), 1–7. [doi: 10.1162/GLEP_a_00039]

Petermann, Anne (2012) "On Not Attending the UN Climate Conference in Doha" in *It's Our Economy*. [Retrieved: February 4, 2015 from <http://itsoureconomy.us/2012/12/climate-negotiations-more-like-carbontrade-show-bans-observers>]

Sethi, Surya P. (2010) "Beyond Copenhagen", Paper presented at the IFRI Annual Conference 2010, Brussels. [Retrieved: January 28, 2015 from http://www.ifri.org/downloads/comptes_rendu/fichiers/29/ssethi.pdf]

Shukla, Shruti (2010) *Annual Report - Southern Capacity Building Programme*. Delhi: CAN International. [Retrieved: July 12, 2011 from http://climatenetwork.org/sites/default/files/SCB_ANNUAL_Report_Lite.pdf]

UNECE (2010) *Promoting the Principles of the Aarhus Convention in the Lead up to, During and After the United Nations Climate Change Conference 2009, Copenhagen*. Geneva: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. [Retrieved: October 15, 2010 from <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/smsn/igo/088.pdf>]

UNFCCC (1992) *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*. Bonn: UNFCCC. [Retrieved: February 15, 2008 from <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf>]

- UNFCCC (1996) "Organizational Matters: Adoption of the Rules of Procedure. Note by the Secretariat." UNFCCC. [Retrieved: May 13, 2009 from <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop2/02.pdf>]
- UNFCCC (1998) *Decision 18/CP.4 - Attendance of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations at contact groups*. Bonn: UNFCCC. [Retrieved: July 17, 2010 from <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop4/16a01.pdf#page=66>]
- UNFCCC (2003) *Guidelines for the Participation of Representatives of Non-Governmental Organizations at Meetings of the Bodies of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*. Bonn: UNFCCC. [Retrieved: July 3, 2010 from http://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/ngo/application/pdf/coc_guide.pdf]
- UNFCCC (2004) *Promoting Effective Participation in the Convention Process. Note by the Secretariat*. Bonn: UNFCCC. [Retrieved: January 23, 2014 from <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2004/sbi/05.pdf>]
- UNFCCC (2013) "Submissions from Observer Organizations". [http://unfccc.int/documentation/submissions_from_observers/items/7478.php]
- UNFCCC (2014a) *Historical Participation Breakdown by Category of Participants, COP 3-20*. Bonn: UNFCCC. [Retrieved: Jan 26, 2015 from http://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/ngo/application/pdf/participation_breakdown_at_cops.pdf]
- UNFCCC (2014b) *Constituencies and You*. Bonn: UNFCCC. [Retrieved: January 22, 2015 from http://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/ngo/application/pdf/constituencies_and_you.pdf]
- UNFCCC (2014c) "Task Forces of the Technology Executive Committee". [http://unfccc.int/ttclear/templates/render_cms_page?s=TEC_intersesswrk]
- UNFCCC (2014d) "Information Note: Introduction of Cost Recovery Through Side Events and Exhibits". [https://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/notifications/application/pdf/informationnote_costrecovery_2_june_signed_by.pdf]
- Vidal, John and Jonathan Watts (2009) "Friends of the Earth Among Activists Barred from Copenhagen Conference Centre" in *The Guardian*. [Retrieved: February 21, 2010 from <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/16/friends-of-the-earth-barred-bella-centre>]
- Waddell, Steve (2003) *The Climate Action Network: Civil Society Tackling Global Negotiations*. Boston, Mass.: The Global Action Network Net. [Retrieved: September 27, 2006 from <http://www.gan-net.net/pdfs/can.pdf>]
- Westerlind-Wigström, Astrid (2008) *The Climate Action Network on Adaptation: Is It Responsive to Southern NGOs?*. MSc Thesis Environmental Change and Management, University of Oxford.
- Westerlind-Wigström, Astrid (2009) "The Challenge for the Climate Action Network". [<http://www.tiempocyberclimate.org/newswatch/comment090424.htm>]